On my Occasional Dissident essay site (blog.iraq-itag.org), I have posted an argument against the jingoism engaged in by the Washington Post editorial board over the fight for South Ossetia. A series of editorials beat the drums of war relentlessly, quite heedless of the facts. In addition to the instances mentioned in my essay, the paper recently ran an editorial on the Russian-Georgian conflict that failed even to mention the name South Ossetia—the fulcrum of the current emergency. Two days ago, the paper ran a story by reporter Jonathan Finer noting that investigators could not find evidence that a mine was responsible for a recent train explosion. The very next day, the paper's editorial accused Russia of mining Georgia's railways. Based on what evidence? Apparently, based on no evidence. Once again, the USS Maine sinks.

In my essay, I ask a series of questions that cause us to take a more nuanced and, I hope, more consistent look at this conflict. I would like to propose another: What if Russia had joined Georgia in attacking South Ossetia? I am convinced we would have been outraged. Why? Well, not necessarily because we support the South Ossetians; the South Ossetian desire for self-determination is rejected by the West. Rather, we would have been against the Russians and their participation in what was, in fact, a violent and unjustified attack against citizens and their city. Our principle is not self-determination as you might rightly expect it to be. Rather, it is opposition to Russia that drives our actions. We make much of the Russian threat to Georgian democracy, for example. But the Economist magazine's 2007 democracy index places Russia at 102 on its list, ahead of Georgia at 104. A beacon of democratic expression Georgia is not.

We actually went to war to secure the right of self-determination for former republics of Yugoslavia, and did so again when a province of Serbia, Kosovo, was attacked in much the same way South Ossetia was attacked by Georgian forces ordered forward by President Saakashvili. Russia rejected our support for Kosovo independence just as we rejected Russia's endorsement of Abkhazian and South Ossetian independence. Clearly, neither we, nor the Russians, are consistent. But we could be. We supported self-determination throughout the former Yugoslavia as already pointed out. We supported the Chechnians in their fight for freedom from Russia and condemned the actions of the Russian military and government there. If we supported the bid for independence by Abkhazia and South Ossetia, we would be true to this principle. Russia, opposing the West's actions in Yugoslavia, now has adopted our approach in this instance. It is also a reverse of their actions in Chechnya. Were we to stand by a principle of self-determination here, the Russians would stand alone as hypocrites. Better them than us.