Paul writes: It seems the more I read Kant, the more I agree. I disagreed while reading other works primarily because the concepts were presented as absolutes and the logical contradictions were not addressed. I found something useful at the following link: http://ethics.acusd.edu/Books/Kant/ScienceofRight/NS/Kant_ScienceofRight_NS.htm I will quote the applicable section here (from The Science of Right, by Immanuele Kant, Hastie translation): ---------------------------------------------- II. The Right of Necessity. The so-called right of necessity (jus necessitatis) is the supposed right or title, in case of the danger of losing my own life, to take away the life of another who has, in fact, done me no harm. It is evident that, viewed as a doctrine of right, this must involve a contradiction, For this is not the case of a wrongful aggressor making an unjust assault upon my life, and whom I anticipate by depriving him of his own (jus inculpatae tutelae); nor consequently is it a question merely of the recommendation of moderation which belongs to ethics as the doctrine of virtue, and not to jurisprudence as the doctrine of right. It is a question of the allowableness of using violence against one who has used none against me. It is clear that the assertion of such a right is not to be understood objectively as being in accordance with what a law would prescribe, but merely subjectively, as proceeding on the assumption of how a sentence would be pronounced by a court in the case. There can, in fact, be no criminal law assigning the penalty of death to a man who, when shipwrecked and struggling in extreme danger for his life, and in order to save it, may thrust another from a plank on which he had saved himself. For the punishment threatened by the law could not possibly have greater power than the fear of the loss of life in the case in question. Such a penal law would thus fail altogether to exercise its intended effect; for the threat of an evil which is still uncertain- such as death by a judicial sentence- could not overcome the fear of an evil which is certain, as drowning is in such circumstances. An act of violent self-preservation, then, ought not to be considered as altogether beyond condemnation (inculpabile); it is only to be adjudged as exempt from punishment (impunibile). Yet this subjective condition of impunity, by a strange confusion of ideas, has been regarded by jurists as equivalent to objective lawfulness. The dictum of the right of necessity is put in these terms: "Necessity has no law" (Necessitas non habet legem). And yet there cannot be a necessity that could make what is wrong lawful. It is apparent, then, that in. judgements relating both to "equity" and "the right of necessity," the equivocations involved arise from an interchange of the objective and subjective grounds that enter into the application of the principles of right, when viewed respectively by reason or by a judicial tribunal. What one may have good grounds for recognising as right, in itself, may not find confirmation in a court of justice; and what he must consider to be wrong, in itself, may obtain recognition in such a court. And the reason of this is that the conception of right is not taken in the two cases in one and the same sense. -------------------------------------------------- I'm not quite sure I can explain why this helps, except that it indirectly addresses the logical contradictions mentioned numerous times in our previous discussion. It also mentions some of the shortcomings of legal systems, so might apply on some level to the discussion on California law and defense of personal property. I do have additional disagreements with this document, of course, but I have not finished reading it, and so far, the disagreements are with generalizations that have been specifically identified as generalizations in the text, so there is little reason to state them. This document particularly interests me because it is intentionally filled with contradictions. Yes it is, and it’s also very valuable in evaluating ethics. Here’s my take on it. The idea of necessity is not truly sustained. The shipwrecked man is under the impression he’s going to die, and the only thing that can save him is the death of another. The two men could have shared the plank, there could be a ship minutes away from rescuing them, and the definition of the man with the plank as a resource to be exploited is chillingly anti-social. There is an excellent passage in the book A Libertarian Primer by David Boaz that directly addresses the question of using emergency ethics. I’m going to paraphrase it. Life and death struggles are instructive because they illustrate the edges of ethics. However, the vast majority of our legal life is not lived out under severe emergency duress or life-and-death struggle. In this case, libertarian-themed law would judge the man as a murderer, and I agree with that assessment, given what we have presented to us. The key here is that the man with the plank offered no threat to the plankless man and that the actions of the plankless man lead directly to the death of the guy with the plank. “The so-called right of necessity (jus necessitatis) is the supposed right or title, in case of the danger of losing my own life, to take away the life of another who has, in fact, done me no harm.” He may be in danger of losing his own life, but that fails to erase the right to life and property of the man holding the plank. The circumstances do not change our rights. This is a crucial difference. Kant says circumstances change the way law can be applied in both exterior (courts, judges, prisons) and interior (moral decision-making) ways. You can see the obvious repercussions in the ethical discussions surrounding abortion. The fetus/baby, in the vast majority of cases, does you no harm. Your life might be in danger of changing, and changing dramatically. The decision to abort the pregnancy to avoid the “trouble” of having a child is supported by jus necessitatis, as the right to having an “untroubled” life are held to be more important than the right to live of the fetus/baby. The right of the plankless man to take (steal) the plank of another, and therefore trade destinies with that man therefore has the structural problem of having no real bottom or limit because we are all operating a priori. From a libertarian viewpoint, we have no real way of knowing if the plankless man would definitely die, but we do know that the property rights of the man with the plank were definitely violated. The man that takes the plank then incurs a debt from the man that he stole it from. This debt might be repaid in court. He may be found guilty of manslaughter. He may be found guilty of murder (negligent homicide). He might be found guilty of theft. He might be acquitted considering the circumstances. But in no case is the man legally untouchable, as Kant first describes as “There can, in fact, be no criminal law assigning the penalty of death to a man who, when shipwrecked and struggling in extreme danger for his life, and in order to save it, may thrust another from a plank on which he had saved himself.” Sure we can. We do it all the time in our own legal system. We hold people accountable for their actions largely apart from the circumstances. Later, Kant does say that “What one may have good grounds for recognizing as right, in itself, may not find confirmation in a court of justice; and what he must consider to be wrong, in itself, may obtain recognition in such a court. And the reason of this is that the conception of right is not taken in the two cases in one and the same sense.” This is an important passage. Kant says that circumstances can confound and confuse what is “right” and what is “wrong”. This is true only in the sense that courts and judges can be corrupt, or can hold people accountable for things that are beyond their control. The proposed drowning man situation, however, doesn’t really have any of those problems. The choice to take someone else’s plank instead of finding your own is within the man’s control. To me, Kant introduces a subjectivity that does not exist in Libertarian philosophy. Property rights, to a libertarian, are immutable. If you steal bread to survive, you incur a debt that you must offer to repay once you are back on your feet. If the property owner that you stole from absolves you of your debt by saying “it’s ok, man, forget about it.” Then you are absolved. However, just because you were starving to death doesn’t mean you didn’t incur this debt. Kant says it does matter – that starvation, threat of drowning, etc change the very fabric of rights. I would argue that it doesn’t, because introducing subjectivity to this level excuses a whole host of nefarious ethical problems. People have been fighting over this aspect of Kantian ethics for a long time because we want and need to allow for context, and extenuating circumstances. It can seem heartless to expect the man under threat of drowning to find his own goddamn plank, or negotiate to share the one that the other guy has. It’s either still a theft, or it’s excusable. If it is excusable in some sense, or can be redefined in some way, then murder isn’t always murder. Since murder is the theft of life, almost any theft can then be explained away if the subjective experience of the thief is compelling enough to society. If it’s ok for a man to push another man off a plank while shipwrecked at sea, and therefore causing that man’s death, then let’s look at what happens when we start making adjustments. It’s ok to shoot and kill (cause the drowning of) my boss (shipwrecked comrade). He has the job (plank) I want. If I don’t get that job (plank), I won’t get a raise (be able to make it to shore). I might stay relatively poor (“drown” in debt) without that raise because inflation (sea water) is rising rapidly. This is completely different than the ethical concept of self-defense. Self-defense requires that you are directly threatened, or that another person is directly threatened. If the man with the plank pulled out a dagger, and stabbed the drowning man, then I could see the drowning man yanking the plank away and letting the dagger-happy idiot drown. Another related aspect is this: Does it help the poor for the rich to be made poor? Does it help a drowning man if we are all then thrown in the water? Does it help the ignorant if education is abandoned? Does it help those without talent if everyone is made talentless? These are the "Harrison Bergeron" scenarios that are made possible, in part, by jus necessitatis. Harrison Bergeron is a Kurt Vonnegut short story. Beautiful people are forced to wear ugly masks, smart people have clanging bells in their ears to disrupt their thinking, and ballerinas wear hobbling weights. The necessity of life – the excusable action of one person to take the life of another that offers them no harm, because they think their own life would end if they didn’t take that action, is translated by Vonnegut into everyday behaviour. It’s a very useful thing to extend “emergency ethics” into everyday life in order to test it. Vonnegut exploits a political desire for equal outcomes instead of equal opportunity. That is an aspect of Kantian jus necessitatis. It justifies the means by the ends. Equal outcomes (protagonists continuing to live) are justified despite the actions taken (theft of plank leading to death of former plankholder). Good stuff, hope you keep reading Kant! I like the things you’re bringing up. Hegel and Karl Popper are also quite good.
 

After a bit more careful reading, I think I agree with you on almost all the points you have made, but I think we went in two different directions. I'm going to ignore the abortion case, not because I don't have an opinion, but because that is one subject I'm not willing to risk discussing, even with you. To clarify what caught my attention, I've taken three sections from the original: For the punishment threatened by the law could not possibly have greater power than the fear of the loss of life in the case in question. Such a penal law would thus fail altogether to exercise its intended effect; for the threat of an evil which is still uncertain- such as death by a judicial sentence- could not overcome the fear of an evil which is certain, as drowning is in such circumstances. An act of violent self-preservation, then, ought not to be considered as altogether beyond condemnation (inculpabile); it is only to be adjudged as exempt from punishment (impunibile). Yet this subjective condition of impunity, by a strange confusion of ideas, has been regarded by jurists as equivalent to objective lawfulness. The dictum of the right of necessity is put in these terms: "Necessity has no law" (Necessitas non habet legem). And yet there cannot be a necessity that could make what is wrong lawful. ------------------------------------------------------ And another from your response: To me, Kant introduces a subjectivity that does not exist in Libertarian philosophy. Property rights, to a libertarian, are immutable. If you steal bread to survive, you incur a debt that you must offer to repay once you are back on your feet. If the property owner that you stole from absolves you of your debt by saying “it’s ok, man, forget about it.” Then you are absolved. However, just because you were starving to death doesn’t mean you didn’t incur this debt. Kant says it does matter – that starvation, threat of drowning, etc change the very fabric of rights. I would argue that it doesn’t, because introducing subjectivity to this level excuses a whole host of nefarious ethical problems. ------------------------------------------------------ I agree with you, as far as the absolute interpretation goes. However, my interpretation was not an evaluation of the specific case or even an attempt to define right and wrong, but an evaluation of the ability of a law to influence the decision-making process in this type of situation. Laws are intended to influence/manipulate people to behave in a certain way. In our culture, some attempt this with fines, others with punishments including time in jail, public service, or death. In other cultures, other types of punishments may be used. Some laws are written to attempt to force repayment of the debts you mention. Others to cause people to think before they act. Most are written to prevent actions rather than to punish them, though they use punishment as a deterrent. None of these laws has any effect if the danger to the individual is percieved to be greater than the threat of punishment. Some have little effect even when there is no danger to the individual, but I think Kant is referring to an individual who does not normally live an immoral life. My personal opinion at the time I wrote this was that a person who will put the life of another before his/her own is rare, regardless of what is right or wrong, and regardless of the law. I've since been partially corrected by Amy. She mentioned that we regularly hear stories of parents putting the lives of their children before their own. I am still not sure this is quite as common as she thinks it is, but I do have to admit it happens often enough to be notable. I'm not sure how much of this tendency remains when there is no family member or close friend involved. I do know that military organizations pin medals on people (often posthumously) for such actions. If it were more common, the stories would not be nearly as moving, nor would the medals carry the weight they do.
 

I am in agreement with Amy. She and I have talked about this subject before on a few occasions. I think it was in a conversation about the Sheepdog post that it most recently came up. Speaking as and for the other parents I've talked with about the subject, it almost goes without saying that a parent will sacrifice absolutely anything, including their life, to save their child. You think about it a lot when you have genetic or social/adopted children. A related question is, would you sacrifice your life for *someone else's* child? The genetic ties aren't there. Many people would, without a moment's hesitation. We do celebrate these things not because the capacity is uncommon, but because our society has evolved to the point where these sacrifices aren't as necessary as they otherwise might be. The capacity and ability to act heroically altruistic to save a life isn't rare. The opportunity to express it (very fortunately) is. [Digression]Having children can mean constant, bone-marrow-deep worry. You have chosen glorious heartbreak, you have made a committment to the future for good or ill, you have deliberately broken your own individuality down into chunks, and set parts of it free in other sentient being(s). That "other" sort-of-you is free to make choices that bring out the worst in you. It's not all bad, but you chose a vulnerability that opens you up to a great deal of potential pain. This type of deliberate choice is the sort of thing that many people call the soul of society. When I describe someone as anti-social, it usually means they are nefariously selfish. That would be a good thing to tackle - what is "being social" and "being anti-social" really mean?[/Digression]
 

Not having any children of my own makes it difficult to argue with that viewpoint. I have stepped in front of a moving vehicle to stop a child from running in front of it. The vehicle had plenty of room to stop, so it does not seem like a big deal to me. However, a change to that scenario as simple as the car being driven by a 90-year-old who confused the gas pedal for the brake could have left me quite incorrectly labeled a hero. I don't see that situation fitting the description Kant applies, however, with a minor exception not directly related to the proposed scenario: If a child's parents did not run in front of a fast-moving train to attempt to move the child off the tracks, knowing they could not move quickly enough to live through the experience, would you tell them they are terribly evil people, or allow them to live with the guilt on their own? Would you go so far as to attempt to help them deal with the loss of the child? I think I already know the answers to those questions, so you need not answer unless you think I am wrong. The above scenario, of course, is not one of personally taking a life to save one's own. It is one of allowing the death of another to save one's own life. I suspect this decision is usually made instinctively, not intellectually. Some people freeze, others react.
 

I'm not sure I agree with your interpretation of that passage, though I do agree with most of your post. I'm at work, and don't have the time to explain, but hopefully I'll remember later, when I am at home.
 

I agree with you on the vast majority of what you've said. I like the way you think about the things you are reading.