Sheena Sahibdeen
299 Park Avenue
New York, NY 10171
Email:
sheena.sahibdeen@ubs.com
Dear Ms. Sahibdeen,
UBS's reputation as one of the top investment management firms in the world motivates
me to consider a career with your firm. The fast-paced environment and focus on results
and excellence that define UBS would be an ideal place for me in terms of both
personality and skills.
I strive in intense, competitive environments. As a world-level athlete in several sports, I
have developed an insatiable appetite for peak performance and continuous learning. My
trainer and world martial arts champion often said, "Impossible is just someone's
opinion." I live by those words. My unique mix of previous work experience and my
record as a professional athlete demonstrate a level of focus, a pattern of setting and
achieving objectives, as well as adaptation to change.
I live everyday with passion because I embrace change as a daily challenge. Nothing will
prevail over genuine human relations because we succeed as a team, or we fail as
individuals. The skills outlined on my attached resume, along with my work experience,
CFP and RIA certifications demonstrate my aptitude in finance. These skills and the
personal qualities and beliefs I bring to my work fit well with UBS work ethic and make
me an ideal candidate for a career with UBS.
I would welcome the occasion to further discuss career opportunities with UBS, and I
look forward to hearing from you soon. If you have any questions, feel free to contact me
by phone at (203) 823-7026 or by email at
aleksey.vayner@yale.edu.
Sincerely,
Aleksey Vayner
ALEKSEY VAYNER
175 Park Street #3A • New Haven, CT 06511 • (203) 823-7026 • Aleksey.Vayner@yale.edu
EDUCATION and CERTIFICATION
Yale University
, New Haven, CT anticipated May 2007
B.A., in Eastern-European History
•
Spring '06 course work includes Yale School of Management classes; Real Estate Financing
for Institutional Investors, Investment Management, Financial Statement Analysis, and Private
Equity Investing
SEC
anticipated November 2006
NASD Series 65, Registered Investment Advisor
CFP Board/Boston Institute of Finance
anticipated July 2007
CFP®, Certification
PUBLICATION
Vayner A.
Women's Silent Tears; A Unique Gendered Perspective On The Holocaust. Lulu Press New
York, NY. August 2006. Available online at http://www.lulu.com/alekseyvayner
EXPERIENCE
Founder/CEO
Youth Empowerment Strategies Inc., Manhattan, NY 2006 - present
•
YES is a non-profit, community-based organization that works to enhance the quality of
children's lives by implementing a variety of innovative personal achievement and core skills
development programs in some of NYC's most troubled neighborhoods; www.empowerachild.org
Investment Advisor
2006 - present
Vayner Capital Management LLC., Manhattan, NY
•
Advise clients on risk-adverse investment strategies
Martial Arts Instructor/Trainer
2002 – present
•
Taught internal martial arts; student won Korean Nationals Tai-Kwon Do Championships
•
Assessed and treated injuries of muscular-skeletal nature with Chinese medicine
•
Fixed injured backs of 5 athletes on the Yale Varsity V8 Crew squad which won national finals
Investment Risk Analyst- Internship
April 2004 – Sep 2004
The Atlantic Philanthropies (USA) Inc., Manhattan, NY
•
Analyzed $4-billion dollar portfolio; analyzed hedge funds
•
Developed basic investment strategies (reflecting market risk) of hedge funds' niche strategies
using Ibbottson Analyzer, and computed correlations to identify real alpha returns by managers
•
Produced a memo advising how to re-balance portfolio. Responsible to Albert Hsu, CIO (USA)
Executive Assistant
May 2003 – May 2004
Law Offices of Anthony LeCrichia, Manhattan, NY
•
Handled confidential communications, court errands, calendar management, administrative
duties, and computer hardware/software assistance
Loan Officer
May 2003 – Aug 2003
One Source Mortgage Corp., Hackensack, NJ
•
Top-producing loan officer for the month of July, with 27 loans in the pipeline
•
Originated loans, prepared/facilitated financial loan packages, projected due diligence reports,
corresponded with borrowers, lenders, title agencies and attorneys.
Tennis Instructor
1996 – 1999
Roosevelt Island Racquet Club, Manhattan, NY
SKILLS
Quantitative
- Financial modeling, financial statement analysis, cashflow, risk modeling and
analysis, equity risk premium, portfolio optimization, performance measurement
Computer
- Microsoft Office Tools, Ibbotson Analyzer, Excel, MetaStock 8.0, TC2000, LightSpeed,
Calyx, LexisNexis, hardware
Languages
- Fluent English, Russian, elementary Spanish
LEADERSHIP
Martial Arts
- Tai Chi Chuan master; Shaolin Kung Fu 8th Dan 2001-present
Self-Defense
- Teach day-intensive workshops for women (Columbia NYU, Yale, FIT) 2004-present
Powerlifting
- 1650lbs leg press (2005), 495 bench press July 2006
Ballroom Dancing -
amateur pre-champ Intl. Rumba, gold level in other dances 2003-2006
Tennis -
competed on Satellite tour, and nationals. Trained by director of USTA 1992-2005
Video -
footage on success: http://www.alekseyvayner.com/Web/videos.php
Affiliations -
Society of Competitive Intelligence Professionals, Yale Conservative Party of The
Political Union, Yale Ski Team, Yale Ballroom Dance Team
Hedge Funds Selling Beta as Alpha Returns – Risks and Rewards
in Active Investments
Author: Aleksey Vayner
Print: September 2005
Difficult market conditions press institutional investors for greater diversification into
alternative sources to generate positive returns. In their efforts to generate alpha returns,
institutions and sophisticated investors have been drawn to hedge funds since this alternative
investment vehicle has demonstrated sustained ability to beat the indexes and mutual fund
returns. Yale's endowment, managed by David Swensen, allocated roughly 17% of portfolio to
hedge fund managers last year, while some foundations invested as much as 50% of their
portfolio into hedge funds.
Quality returns that result from a manager's skill at beating indexes through active asset
selection without increasing risk to the portfolio are called alpha. Returns that result from mere
exposure to market risk are termed beta. An ever-increasing array of funds to choose from
creates a challenge of finding superior hedge fund managers who consistently generate alpha
returns. Recent influx of money into hedge funds, subsequent competition, and low market
volatility, have reduced alpha-generating opportunities; as the result hedge fund managers have
increasingly turned to taking in risk premiums for the investor, then packaging this beta and
presenting it to investors as alpha returns. As Bruce Brittain of PIMCO bonds accurately notes,
"what is sold as alpha, may in fact be hidden beta exposure as well as a potential Greek alphabet
soup of risks—gamma, rho, vega, etc" (sensitivity of options to the underlying asset, interest and
implied volatility of the underlying asset, respectively).
This occurs in part because alpha cannot always be separated from beta. Strategies that
are able to produce consistent alpha often include
hidden beta exposure. For example,
convertible bond strategies are often short credit duration and long equity volatility; merger
arbitrage strategies utilize short equity puts; global macro funds have duration and currency
exposures; and long-short portfolios often have residual long equity exposure. However, while
this justifies the phenomena to an extent, it does not ease the challenge of evaluating a manager's
skill, since knowing whether the hedge fund manager produces alpha or beta is essential to
creating a balanced, risk-adverse portfolio. Investors should expect, and demand significant
alpha when paying 2% management and 20% incentive fees charged by most hedge fund
managers.
One effective method to identify superior managers is to utilize correlation analysis
techniques to separate returns from market risk exposure (beta component) from the returns that
result from a manager's skill at delivering excess returns (alpha) in his niche strategy. In the
context of alpha-beta analysis it is also important to keep in mind that hedge fund strategies
differ greatly from one another, because investment returns, volatility, and risk vary enormously
among the different hedge fund strategies. Some strategies which are not correlated to equity
markets are able to deliver consistent returns with extremely low risk of loss, while others may
be as, or more volatile than mutual funds. Many, but not all, hedge fund strategies tend to hedge
against downturns in the markets being traded. Successful investment in a hedge fund depends
on a thorough review and careful selection of its management team, understanding their
investment approach, and how it affects the risk profile of your existing portfolio. However, the
amount of alpha that is consistently present in the portfolio remains the most important factor for
a portfolio's long-term investment success.
For analytical purposes of estimating the investment's beta, investors often use historical
returns for various funds and for the market. When the beta is identified, the investment's
residual return is simply the total return minus the beta, multiplied by the market return. Bob
Litterman at Goldman Sachs, a co-developer, along with the late Fischer Black, of the Black-
Litterman Global Asset Allocation Model, (a key tool in Goldman Sachs Asset Management's
asset allocation process), explains simply that "the average value of the residual return is the
historical alpha of the product. The volatility of the residual returns is its active risk (B.
Litterman, GS.
All Alphas Are Not Created Equal, 2004)." Because extensive frequent historical
returns are often not available for hedge funds however, it makes the task of separating alpha
from beta more difficult. Analysis that focus on correlations between the manager's returns and
respective naïve strategy replications and indexes within market cycles produce a clearer picture
as to the alpha and beta returns present in the portfolio (i.e. the quality of hedge fund managers
that make up a particular portfolio). Correlation is a statistical technique which can show
whether and how strongly pairs of variables are related. High correlation between hedge fund
managers' returns and naïve strategies (or even indexes) is a sign of high beta and rather low
alpha returns. Naïve strategy is one that is passive (an investment that does not require active
stock selection process that a manager would engage in to generate alpha, thus done with little
effort and low management cost), yet accurately reflects the systematic risks hedge fund
managers generally take. Hedge funds correlation statistics are presented then between their
respective indexes and the naïve strategies. While other methods for evaluating a managers'
performance are available, this remains to be the best for individual investors and smaller firms
who do not have institution-size resources and capital to carry out grand due diligence processes.
Consider proprietary analysis of hedge fund returns performed by Bridgewater Associates, a
currency investment powerhouse, a fund that manages over $120 billion dollars in assets, and
provides a variety of specialized alpha overlay strategies. Their research focused on five
strategies, and has demonstrated that some of the most popular hedge fund strategies appear to
possess high correlations to respectively naïve strategies. For accurate presentation we replicated
Bridgewater's naïve emerging markets and distressed strategies because their correlations were
particularly high and noteworthy. The research performed by Bridgewater Associates in the
market of alternative
investments is quite
revealing with respect
to high beta present
among certain
strategies. For
example, Bridgewater
discovered that a naïve
strategy of buying into every M&A announcement you see in the newspaper returned 10%, while
M&A arbitrage hedge funds returned 9%. Of the seven investment strategies tested only one beat
the comparable naïve strategy, created true alpha (G. Jensen, Bridgewater Associates Inc.
Daily
Observations
. February 17, 2004).
More revealing is Bridgewater's discovery of the high correlation of hedge funds within
strategies. After pooling together data for over 1600 hedge funds and looking at the typical
correlation between managers, Bridgewater saw that they were extremely correlated to one
another.
Hedge Fund Indices 2003 Returns Net of Fees vs. Naive Replications (Beta)
This data is evidence that many hedge fund managers are taking in risk premiums, and are not
capturing alpha returns by means of active security selection. Low correlations between these
managers would be evidence that they may have captured true alpha.
Strategy Return Naïve Replication HF Alpha
Dedicated Short Bias -32.6% -25.6%
-7.0%
Emerging Markets 28.7% 51.6%
-22.9%
Distressed Securities 25.1% 26.9%
-1.8%
M&A Arbitrage 9.0% 10.0%
-1.1%
Fixed Income Arbitrage 8.0% 13.7%
-5.7%
Long/Short Equity 17.3% 19.4%
-2.2%
Managed Futures 14.1% 4.7%
9.5%
Emerging Market Strategy Replication
In some cases, beta returns are not hard to separate from alpha returns. Presented below are my
analysis of replicated emerging market and distressed securities strategies in greater detail.
Utilizing Ibbotson Analyzer Software I created weighted inputs to mimic the risks active
managers take. The weights allocated to particular component of a naïve strategy are shown in
the charts. All the indexes, the CSFB/Tremont, and hedge fund returns are presented over cash,
meaning that Merrill Lynch US 3 month Treasury bill was subtracted from the index or hedge
fund's returns. All subtractions are geometric. When Ibbotson Analyzer ran the correlation
analysis I generated the six months rolling returns line graphs, also presented bellow.
The graph below illustrates that the monthly returns of emerging market hedge funds, as
collected by CSFB/Tremont, are over 80% correlated to a naïve 50/50 mix of emerging market
equities and bonds. Hedge fund managers specializing in emerging market strategies often fail to
outperform this simple combination. In 2003 the naïve strategy approach returned over 50%,
while emerging market hedge funds returned 28.7% (Bridgewater, 2004).
Naïve Emerging Market Strategy: Correlation: 0.805
Hedge Fund Groups by
Strategy
Avg. Correlation of
HF Returns
over cash
w/in Group
Convertible Arbitrage 60%
Dedicated Short Bias 51%
Emerging Markets 59%
Equity Market Neutral 42%
Event Driven 66%
Fixed Income Arbitrage 52%
Global Macro 47%
Long/Short Equity 63%
Managed Futures 57%
Multi Strategy 53%
Index Weight
JP Morgan EMBI+ Composite 50%
S&P/IFCI Emerging Composite 50%
CSFB/Tremont Emerging Markets Index vs. Naïve EM strategy
Interval: 6
Return Values
Interval: 6 Months
Rolling Line Graph
-8.0%
7.0%
-7.0%
-6.0%
-5.0%
-4.0%
-3.0%
-2.0%
-1.0%
0.0%
1.0%
2.0%
3.0%
4.0%
5.0%
6.0%
0.7%
0.5%
May
1994
May
2004
Dec
1994
Jun
1995
Dec
1995
Jun
1996
Dec
1996
Jun
1997
Dec
1997
Jun
1998
Dec
1998
Jun
1999
Dec
1999
Jun
2000
Dec
2000
Jun
2001
Dec
2001
Jun
2002
Dec
2002
Jun
2003
Dec
2003
CSFB/Tremont Emerging Markets (%Total Return) EM Strategy Replication 2
('EM Strategy Replication 2' should be written as 'EM Naïve Strategy')
Similar scenario occurs with hedge fund managers within distressed securities strategy, where
the correlation is 0.8, rounded. To create a naive distressed securities strategy one would subtract
the US Government TR from Merrill Lynch 1-5 year C rate high yield to create a corporate
spread, and weight the spread with an applicable EMBI index. Thus, closely replicating the
systematic risks that hedge fund managers take in this niche market, the level of correlation
could be used as an initial test as to whether or not a manager is producing alpha returns. (The
highest correlation was produced with intermediate term US Government TR.)
Naïve Distressed Securities Strategy: Correlation 0.79
CSFB/Tremont Distressed Index vs. Naïve Distressed Securities Strategy
Index Weight
Corporate Spread1 =
ML 1-5 Yr C Rated Hi Yld – US IT Gvt
28%
Corporate Spread2 =
Altman NYU Defaulted Debt - US IT Gvt
28%
JP Morgan EMBI+ Composite 44%
Interval: 6
Return Values
Interval: 6 Months
Rolling Line Graph
-8.0%
11.0%
-7.0%
-6.0%
-5.0%
-4.0%
-3.0%
-2.0%
-1.0%
0.0%
1.0%
2.0%
3.0%
4.0%
5.0%
6.0%
7.0%
8.0%
9.0%
10.0%
1.2%
1.0%
May
1997
Apr
2004
Dec
1997
Jun
1998
Dec
1998
Jun
1999
Dec
1999
Jun
2000
Dec
2000
Jun
2001
Dec
2001
Jun
2002
Dec
2002
Jun
2003
Dec
2003
CSFB/Tremont Distressed Distressed Strategy Replication
The current low-return (from traditional asset classes) environment increases investor reliance on
alpha to generate solid positive returns. By separating alpha from beta, investors can focus on
finding high alpha managers irrespective of asset class. While results of presented alpha/beta
analysis are not definitive, they demonstrate where and how practical application of the theory is
used. With naïve strategy replication and correlation analysis it is easy to determine that many
managers consistently have high betas and correlations to a series of different valuation criteria.
Such hedge funds, unfortunately, often represent 25% or more of all the hedge funds in
foundations' portfolios. More than 50% of Asia/Japan oriented hedge fund managers appear to
have high correlations to their respective indexes. Of course, in analyzing the returns of hedge
fund managers and the amount of alpha they generate investors should not limit themselves to
correlation analysis. At least several other evaluation criteria of alpha and beta returns, besides
correlation, should be considered, including but not limited to, capital, cost, capacity, and
confidence (GS & CO., Letter to Investors:
Evaluating Sources of Alpha).
Capital is the amount of dollars that it takes to create an X dollar amount of given alpha returns.
It might be an industry standard to expect a good equity manager to generate $4 for every $100
of assets, while a good bond manager is expected to generate only $1 from the same asset level.
Since it is capital first and foremost, and not risk that is the investor's constraint to generating
alpha returns, high risk and higher volatility strategies appear to be more attractive because they
require less capital. It is worth noting that at the same time search for alpha in active
investments, according to Goldman Sachs' active alpha investment specialists, is an approach to
portfolio management that divides sources of risk into three specific components, interest rate,
market, and active risk, to optimize portfolio's risk while maximizing its returns (GS, Letter to
Investors:
All Alphas Are Not Created Equal (part two), 2004). Understanding and separating
these risks allows for greater accuracy and efficiency in sizing and monitoring of risks, which in
turn should allow portfolio managers to significantly increase active risk (add active managers to
the portfolio) since its not correlated with market risk. This should positively impact the amount
of alpha in total expected returns.
Cost is another component worth evaluating; it is the price that investors pay for acquiring alpha
returns. The price of passive exposure to markets is practically null. A management fee for
holding an S&P 500 index position is approximately 5 bps, which translates into 1-2% of the
equity risk premium (GS,
All Alphas Are Not Created Equal, 2004). In stark contrast to the
passive index position, an active investment strategy could consume as much as 50% of the
realized gross excess return. Considering the uncertainty of hedge fund managers outperforming
their respective benchmarks, it makes sense that hedge funds employ inventive fees. Incentive
fee payment structure makes sense if the information ratio expected by the investor is less than
what the manager asses it to be. It is clear that active manager fees should be proportional to
expected gross alpha, and the managers that have proven track records are expected to charge
more.
Information ratio relates to the confidence analysis, as it measures the degree of portfolio
manager skill. IR is the investor's expectation of the manager's alpha per unit of active risk, it is
the confidence component of investment returns analysis, and is probably the most difficult one
to forecast (GS, Letters to Investors. 2004). A strategy becomes more attractive as information
ratio increases. Typically net IRs of 0.2 or better are very desirable, while net IRs of 0.5 or
higher are not desirable and are rare. Since great investment results can be generated by luck in
the short-term, and past performance is not a predictor of future results, it is difficult to develop
confidence in manager's ability to create alpha. Nevertheless, most investors focus on recent past
performance and to develop the confidence in a hedge fund manager follow through with a
thorough due diligence analysis of the manager, his team, and the strength of their niche
investment strategy.
Capacity is the last component mentioned that should be considered in evaluating hedge fund
manager's returns. It simply refers to the fund's long-term ability to generate alpha in light of its
investment strategy and increased assets under management. Certain strategies in relatively small
and illiquid asset classes such as arbitrage, emerging market debt, high yield, convertible bonds
and few others are bound to have lower active returns in the future as money is injected into the
fund. Large inflow of cash into these strategies is likely to shift these markets toward
equilibrium, eliminating alpha generating opportunities.
Some active managers would suggest that the reason they generate less alpha returns lies with
the fiduciaries and the constraints imposed by them. Managers suggest that constraints are
chipping away at their alpha. While such claims not entirely true, there is evidence to suggest
that relaxing constraints will produce higher alpha returns. Fiduciaries try to limit the risk of their
portfolios by restricting their managers' ability to act. Some constraints such as having a risk
budget are simply necessary. The problem with constraints eroding alpha arises in the area of
risk control. Here constraints should act as a secondary level of risk control beyond internal
measures of control already taken by the active hedge fund manager. Instead, the limits on the
exposures that managers are permitted to take are often absolute and too rigid (B. Littlerman,
GS:
Are Constraints Eating Your Alpha? 2005). If, as such absolute constraints often do, they
limit manager's access to investment opportunities, they in fact limit opportunity to generate
excess returns, creating deteriorating alpha. Actual constraints should always be adjusted to
reflect the manager's strategies and skill. Active currency management, for example, is a strategy
that generates attractive, quality risk-adjusted alpha returns if utilized within the framework of
relaxed constraints and diversification. This is evident because the universe of currencies is
small, and the typical analytical tools don't always work because the economic data varies
significantly from country to country. The key to alpha returns in this asset class, Litterman
suggests, is the diversification "not by currency type, but by style and strategy as well."
Transparency and liquidity are only some of the important factors to consider when mixing
currency types, styles, and strategies, but this form of diversification can positively impact riskadjusted
returns of the portfolio, he says
.
Although the focus has been on alpha and beta returns among hedge funds, there are many other
alternatives to finding and capitalizing on alpha returns. Alpha can also be found in a variety of
overlay strategies, private equity, commodities, real estate, and moving or 'porting' alpha from a
manager in one asset class to another. Portable alpha strategies are of key importance in the
alternative asset class divisions of investment banking powerhouses such as Goldman Sachs.
Their approach to alpha investing, the
Active Alpha Investing plan suggests that "the asset classes
where you search for alpha need not be from the same as those in your strategic asset allocation."
In their example, liquid derivatives markets create opportunities to transport alpha from one
benchmark to another (GS, Letters to Investors, 2005).
Finally, it is important to remember that while alpha strategies may represent a more efficient
allocation of capital relative to a traditionally structured portfolio, they are considerably more
complex to manage. Implementation issues require serious consideration and study before
engagement. Many of the alpha solutions engineered by the investment industry have opaque
costs and require ongoing management oversight. Highly customized strategies may look
compelling on entry but may have significant exit costs or limited liquidity. To be successful, an
alpha strategy must identify managers with consistent alpha, find appropriate beta transfer
candidates, and have the expertise to execute the strategy. Managers producing consistent alpha
are impossible to identify if they are new to the industry and do not have a track record.
Individual sophisticated investors may loose their shirt investing with new hedge funds if they
lack institutional-size capital to conduct a thorough due diligence process.