Patrick McElwee and Robert Naiman

In October 2006 researchers from Johns Hopkins University published a peer-reviewed article in The Lancet, one of Europe's most important and respected medical journals, estimating that 650,000 Iraqis had been killed due to the U.S.-led invasion of their country, 601,000 violently.¹ The report was quickly marginalized in public debate in the United States.

The researchers' methods were not to blame. They used the method accepted around the world to measure demographics such as birth and death rates in the wake of natural and man-made disasters: a cluster survey. No one found substantive flaws in the way they conducted their research. Instead, their findings were dismissed because they asked the politically charged question of how many Iraqis have died, and the answer they found was unacceptably high.

Since the Lancet estimate was based on a survey completed in July 2006 and no new demographic studies have been conducted since, Just Foreign Policy has created an update of the Lancet estimate to account for the violent deaths that have occurred since, in an effort to put the question of the overall death toll back on the table. We did this by extrapolating from the Lancet estimate using a trend line derived from a database of deaths reported in the Western media, maintained by Iraq Body Count.² Our best estimate, which we update regularly, is that over a million Iraqis have been killed violently as a result of the invasion and occupation.³

The treatment of the Lancet study and its findings has really been exceptional. In other war zones, results from cluster surveys have become the standard estimate of deaths. The cluster survey-based estimate that 200,000 have died in Darfur, for example, is consistently cited as established fact by both the U.S. media and the Bush administration.

There are no competing scientific studies of post-invasion deaths in Iraq. Neither the occupying forces nor the Iraqi government has commissioned an official, scientific study of Iraqi deaths, despite - or perhaps because of - the centrality of the death toll to assessing the decision by the United States to go to war. Aside from occasional unsubstantiated assertions from President Bush, the U.S. government does not even guess at Iraqi deaths. The standard estimates of Iraqi deaths quoted by the press and dominant policy makers come from two clearly inadequate sources: media reports and politicized assertions by the Iraqi government.

The media in any country only detect a fraction of all violent deaths. As Patrick Ball has shown, this is particularly true when there is an unusually high level of violence.⁴ In Iraq, the media is limited to shrinking zones of safe passage. While press reports of violence in Iraq are important and often heroically obtained, they cannot provide an assessment of the actual scale of total deaths.

The Iraqi government used to release regular estimates of deaths in the country, but these were politically biased and unreliable. In early 2006, the Iraqi Minister of Health publicly estimated between 40,000 and 50,000 violent Iraqi civilian deaths since the invasion. In October 2006, the same week a study was published in the Lancet estimating 650,000 deaths, the Minister tripled his estimate, saying there had been 150,000. There is simply no centralized reporting mechanism that can count, one-by-one, all violent deaths in Iraq.

As of this writing, Iraq Body Count reports that between 69,000 and 76,000 Iraqi civilians have been killed. But, as Les Roberts, co-author of the Lancet study, points out, "There have to be at least 120,000 and probably 140,000 deaths per year from natural causes in a country with the population of Iraq." If the Iraq Body Count figure captured all deaths (which the group does not claim), then the annual death rate for the past four years has increased less than 15 percent. Roberts remarks that this is not consistent with "numerous stories we hear about overflowing morgues, the need for new cemeteries and new body collection brigades."⁵ Estimates of violent deaths on the scale of the Iraq Body Count numbers are also hard to reconcile with estimates that 4 million Iraqis have fled their homes, since interviews with refugees indicate that the violent death of family members was often the event that precipitated flight.

The Iraq Study Group itself found that "there is significant underreporting of the violence in Iraq." They cite a day in July 2006 when U.S. intelligence reported 93 attacks. "Yet a careful review of reports for that single day brought to light 1,100 acts of violence."⁶ The British daily Independent reports that the Iraqi government bans journalists from the scenes of bombings and has banned hospitals from providing information on casualties.⁷

On January 9, 2007, a reporter from Fox News was embedded with the U.S. Air Force. He reported that planes taking off from his location "dropped thousands of pounds of munitions. They bombed 25 targets deep inside Iraq." Yet no reports of any deaths from those bombings reached the English-language press.⁸

The Brookings Institution reports that the United States military regularly conducts tens of thousands of patrols a week, often in hostile neighborhoods.⁹ It is not known – because it is not reported – how often deadly force is used on these patrols, particularly when soldiers at close range cannot be sure who is a threat and who is not.

There are also indications that the stress of urban combat has led some U.S. soldiers to see all Iraqis as the enemy. The U.S. Army's Mental Health Advisory Team recently found that only 47 percent of soldiers and 38 percent of Marines thought "all non-combatants should be treated with dignity and respect." Just 40 percent of Marines and 55 percent of soldiers said they would report a member of their unit for "injuring or killing an innocent noncombatant."¹⁰ The Nation recently interviewed fifty Iraq combat veterans on the record, of whom "dozens … witnessed Iraqi civilians, including children, dying from American firepower." The veterans said these killings usually went unreported and unpunished, one suggesting that it would be impossible to investigate every incident where an Iraqi civilian was killed or wounded because they are so frequent.¹¹

We also know from experience in Latin America that large numbers of bodies can be "disappeared." Much of the sectarian killing in Iraq is reportedly committed by Iraqi security forces or allied militias who would be capable of such cover-up.

Unfortunately, the debate over whether the U.S. military should end its occupation of Iraq remains largely uninformed by accurate estimates of Iraqi deaths, at least here in the United States. Worse, there seems to be a lack of interest in how many Iraqis have been killed even as many who oppose withdrawal warn of the deaths that would ensue if the troops left. As a result, the American public is completely uninformed as to how many Iraqis have been killed. An AP poll in February asked Americans how many Iraqis had died as a result of the war. The median response was just under 10,000.¹²

The best estimate indicates that more than a million Iraqis have been killed as a result of the invasion and occupation. It is reasonable to suppose that if politicians and news media in the United States were forced to confront this reality, pressure for the end of the war would increase dramatically, and cavalier discussions of new military actions in Iran and Pakistan would be less likely.

Patrick McElwee is a policy analyst and Robert Naiman is a senior policy analyst at Just Foreign Policy, www.justforeignpolicy.org. Their counter of Iraqi deaths can be found at http://www.justforeignpolicy.org/iraq/iraqdeaths.html.

[1] Burnham, Gilbert, Riyadh Lafta, Shannon Doocy, and Les Roberts, "Mortality after the 2003 invasion of Iraq: a cross-sectional cluster sample survey," The Lancet, October 11, 2006, http://www.thelancet.com/webfiles/images/journals/lancet/s0140673606694919.pdf

[2] See http://www.iraqbodycount.org

[3] See the most current estimate and Web counter at: http://www.justforeignpolicy.org/iraq/iraqdeaths.html

[4] See, for example: Ball, Patrick, Paul Kobrak and Herbert F. Spirer, "State Violence in Guatemala, 1960-1996: A Quantitative Reflection," Washington: American Association for the Advancement of Science, 1999, http://shr.aaas.org/guatemala/ciidh/qr/english/qrtitle.html

[5] Roberts, Les, "Iraq's death toll is far worse than our leaders admit," The Independent, February 14, 2007, http://comment.independent.co.uk/commentators/article2268067.ece >

[6] Baker, James and Lee Hamilton, co-chairs, "Iraq Study Group Report," December 2006, p. 62, http://www.bakerinstitute.org/Pubs/iraqstudygroup_findings.pdf

[7] Cockburn, Patrick, "The surge: a special report," The Independent, 7 August 2007, http://news.independent.co.uk/world/middle_east/article2841425.ece

[8] Turse, Nick, "Bombs over Baghdad: The Pentagon's Secret Air War in Iraq," TomDispatch, February 7, 2007, http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/iraq/occupation/2007/0207bombsbaghdad.htm

[9] "Iraq Index," The Brookings Institution, http://www.brookings.edu/fp/saban/iraq/indexarchive.htm

[10] "Mental Health Advisory Team IV, Operation Iraqi Freedom 05-07: Final Report," Office of the Surgeon,Multinational Force-Iraq and Office of the Surgeon General, United States Army Medical Command, November 17, 2006, pp. 35, 37, http://www.armymedicine.army.mil/news/mhat/mhat_iv/mhat-iv.cfm

[11] Hedges, Chris and Laila Al-Arian, "The Other War: Iraq Vets Bear Witness," The Nation, July 9, 2007, http://www.thenation.com/doc/20070730/hedges

[12] "Americans Underestimate Iraqi Death Toll," Associated Press, February 24, 2007, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/huff-wires/20070224/death-in-iraq-ap-poll/

Robert Naiman

One of the most striking things about the Iraq debate is how little the opinions of Iraqis appear to matter concerning the continuing occupation of their country by U.S. troops, given that a key reason, supposedly, for the U.S. occupation is to promote democracy. You might think a key question would be: is continuing the U.S. military occupation in the interest of the majority of Iraqis (a million of whom have been killed)? A key piece of evidence would be: do a majority of Iraqis think that continuing the occupation is in their interest?

The Washington Post reported Monday:

Seven in 10 Iraqis believe the U.S. troop buildup in Baghdad and Anbar province has made security worse in those areas and nearly half want coalition forces to leave immediately, according to a new poll conducted by ABC News, the BBC and the Japanese broadcaster NHK.

Nearly six in 10 Iraqis say attacks on coalition forces are "acceptable," including half of Shiites, which seems like strong evidence that the continuing occupation is unwelcome.

But the Post cites this poll to suggest that Iraqis don't think the surge is working, not to suggest that there is a contradiction between an occupation that is supposed to be in Iraq's interest and the fact that nearly half of Iraqis want U.S. forces to leave immediately.

Last fall, a poll by World Public Opinion found that seven in ten Iraqis wanted U.S. forces to commit to withdraw within a year.

Some may say: it's no surprise that the fact the majority of Iraqis want a timetable for U.S. withdrawal hasn't led to such a timetable. The majority of Americans want such a timetable, and that hasn't led to such a timetable either - so far.

But at least the fact that majority opinion in the U.S. supports such a timetable is a key part of the debate. Reporting on the debate in Congress refers to continuing the "unpopular" occupation - meaning unpopular among Americans, not unpopular among both Americans and Iraqis.

In May, a majority of members of Iraq's parliament signed a draft bill that would require a timetable for the withdrawal of U.S. soldiers from Iraq, the Washington Post reported.

In June, Iraqi legislators passed a resolution requiring the government to seek parliamentary permission for asking the UN to extend the mandate of U.S. forces in Iraq, which expires December 31.

Given the considerable doubt concerning whether Iraqis want U.S. troops in their country, wouldn't it make sense for Congress to require that the Iraqi parliament positively affirm that U.S. forces should stay, as a condition for the occupation to continue? After all, Congress saw fit to include a benchmark concerning the Iraqi parliament's passage of an oil revenue sharing law (not the oil restructuring law now being considered) - why not a benchmark on parliamentary support of the occupation?

Suppose that, as part of the package of limiting measures that Congress is currently considering, they were to consider the following: in order for the U.S. occupation to continue, the Iraqi parliament must confirm by majority vote on a monthly basis that it wants the U.S. occupation to continue. If any month passes in which the Iraqi parliament does not pass such a measure, in the subsequent month the U.S. must withdraw at least 30,000 troops.

This could have the effect of strengthening the Iraqi political process, because it would give the Iraqi parliament a clear role in shaping the withdrawal of U.S. troops. This could also have the effect of triggering an effective timetable for the withdrawal of U.S. troops. If the Iraqi parliament never passed such a measure, the occupation would be over within 6 months. And yet, proponents of such a measure could not be credibly accused of supporting an "artificial timetable" - for what could be less artificial than a withdrawal schedule shaped directly by the actions of the Iraqi parliament?

Get involved.

Robert Naiman

If you formed your impressions solely from mainstream media coverage in the United States, it is quite likely you would have the following understanding of the draft "oil law" being considered by the Iraqi parliament: the US Congress has set a benchmark for the Iraqi parliament to pass an "oil law," and in order to satisfy the benchmark the Iraqi parliament must pass the law it is currently considering.

This is quite a false impression, as can be seen by examining the press coverage and comparing it do what the law passed by Congress actually says.

On July 23, the New York Times reported:

Efforts to achieve national reconciliation in Iraq received a double blow on Sunday. Lawmakers acknowledged that there were still many differences on a proposed law to manage oil revenue, the country's most lucrative resource, making it unlikely they would approve a law before September, when the Bush administration must report to Congress on Iraq's progress toward meeting certain legislative benchmarks.

This strongly implies that if the Iraqi parliament passed the "proposed law to manage oil revenue" it would satisfy the "legislative benchmark."

The Times continues:

The oil law, which would set up a system for managing and developing Iraq's oil resources and would have a companion revenue-sharing law that would apportion oil income among the various groups, had been considered the most likely to be passed before the September report to Congress. But by the time the Iraqis return to Parliament in September, it is highly unlikely that they could meet the midmonth deadline in the United States.

According to the Times, the law "would set up a system for managing and developing Iraq's oil resources." A "companion" revenue-sharing law - that is, a different law - "would apportion oil income among the various groups."

Therefore, if the impression that this article gives is correct, then Congress passed a benchmark that requires the Iraqi parliament to pass a law to "set up a system for managing and developing Iraq's oil resources."

But that's not what Congress did - a fact that can be easily verified, since laws passed by Congress are published on the internet.

Here's what Section 1314 of the FY2007 Supplemental Appropriations Act [P.L.110-28] actually says:

Sec. 1314. (a) Findings Regarding Progress in Iraq, the
Establishment of Benchmarks to Measure That Progress, and Reports to
Congress.–Congress makes the following findings:

…

(b) Conditioning of Future United States Strategy in Iraq on the
Iraqi Government's Record of Performance on Its Benchmarks.–

…

(A) The United States strategy in Iraq, hereafter,
shall be conditioned on the Iraqi government meeting
benchmarks, as told to members of Congress by the
President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of
Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
and reflected in the Iraqi Government's commitments to
the United States, and to the international community,
including:

…

(iii) Enacting and implementing legislation to
ensure the equitable distribution of hydrocarbon
resources of the people of Iraq without regard to
the sect or ethnicity of recipients, and enacting
and implementing legislation to ensure that the
energy resources of Iraq benefit Sunni Arabs, Shia
Arabs, Kurds, and other Iraqi citizens in an
equitable manner.

That's it. It doesn't say anything about restructuring Iraq's oil industry or increasing the role of foreign oil companies. It just says the parliament should enact legislation to ensure that the resources benefit Iraq's citizens in an equitable manner.

As Representative Delahunt stated before a Congressional committee in July:

[The draft hydrocarbon law] creates an obtuse and arcane legal structure for reorganizing Iraq's oil industry. It's important to emphasize that it does not address the fair and equitable distribution of oil revenue among the various Iraqi communities so it should not be confused with the benchmark in the recent supplemental appropriation identified by Congress to be a sign of progress.

Get involved.